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In this paper we discuss cultural trauma with regard to the Hungarian Roma. 
While the concept of cultural trauma is typically understood as connected to a 
discrete event and achieves recognition as cultural trauma through a process 
of broader social recognition, we argue that in the case of the Roma, cultural 
trauma is characterized not by a particular event but rather by a long history 
of exclusion, marginalization and persecution. Secondly, the cultural and dis-
cursive framing of Roma citizenship as “second-class” (and therefore as not 
“truly” Hungarian) operates as: 1) a causal factor in the historical trauma of the 
Roma; 2) a constitutive part of the trauma itself (the trauma as being “other-
ed” while simultaneously having one’s traumatic experience denied); and 3) a 
barrier to the broader recognition and acknowledgment of that traumatic his-
tory and experience. We discuss data from recent fieldwork with Romani self-
government leaders to discuss how these phenomena manifest themselves as 
Romani leaders attempt to achieve political agency in the face of contemporary 
far-right political movements.
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Introduction
In the post-socialist transition within East-Central Europe, beyond the uncertainties 
of the economic and institutional transitions, one of the central concerns for both the 
countries of the region as well as for the West was how social tensions associated 
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with ethnic and national identity would be best managed and mitigated (Bringa, 
2002; Kupchan, 1995; Perry, 2005).1 In this respect, the dissolution of Yugoslavia, 
and the conflict and genocide that resulted, arguably served as a worst-case scenario 
of national trauma from that time within the region, a trauma that continues to have 
social, political and psychological repercussions nearly a quarter-century after the 
war’s formal conclusion (McDowell and Braniff, 2014).
While cultural trauma is frequently associated with a specific traumatic event, 
such as the conflict and genocide in the former Yugoslavia, in this article we focus 
on the Romani experience in the context of the post-socialist transition. In particu-
lar, we examine the Hungarian context and how historical trauma surfaces within 
contemporary political representation. To do this, we investigate Hungary’s Minori-
ties Law, itself a partial response to broader regional concerns over minority rights, 
although also a consequence of agendas aimed at nationalizing Hungarians living 
outside the country’s borders in places like Romania, Slovakia, and the former Yu-
goslavian states (Majtényi and Majtényi, 2016).
With regard to the Romani experience we argue that the experience of trauma 
is not isolated to a particular traumatic event,2 but rather relates to a broader his-
tory of trauma in the form of centuries of social, political and economic exclusion, 
as well as numerous and repeated exposures to persecution and violence. Within the 
context of policies established in no small part in response to specific concerns over 
the potential for regional conflict along the lines of ethnic and national identity, we 
ask how is the more generalized trauma that is part of the Romani living experi-
ence reflected in the experiences of local Romani political leaders? We investigate 
this question by first discussing conceptual frameworks for cultural trauma, relating 
them to the historical and contemporary experience of Roma. We then discuss the 
current political circumstances of minority political representation in Hungary. Fi-
nally, through interviews with Romani self-government leaders, we investigate the 
intersection between cultural trauma and political agency at a time of rising racism, 
nationalism and xenophobia, not only in Hungary, but across Europe.
This paper’s contribution is thus at least twofold. First, it contributes to the 
scholarship on cultural trauma by elaborating on how cultural trauma is conceptual-
ized. We argue that the incompleteness of the cultural “trauma process” for Roma 
1 This work was conducted while the third author was a faculty fellow at the Institute for Ad-
vanced Study at Central European University in Budapest, Hungary. We acknowledge the in-
valuable assistance of Rohanyi Réka in the completion of this work.
2 That said, we do not in any way mean to diminish the traumatic significance of the Holocaust 
for Romani people, an experience that continues to reverberate to the present, as commentators 
have noted (Crowe, 1991; Vermeersch, 2007), and also as our own data clearly suggests, as we 
later show.
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(Alexander, 2012) is in fact a defining feature of Romani cultural trauma, both in 
terms of the experience and identity of Roma, but also in terms of the perpetuation 
of social exclusion and violence. While this article’s contribution is theoretical, con-
ceptual and oriented towards the academic world, we also at the same time hope 
that it contributes to the broader recognition and understanding of Roma as a cultur-
ally traumatized group. As such, this work is motivated by the goal of recognizing 
these long-standing tensions, and therefore this latter motivation is even more criti-
cal for reconciling the lived experience of those who face systemic and pronounced 
social exclusion and persecution.
Cultural Trauma 
The scholarly literature on cultural trauma has largely been shaped by the work of 
Alexander (2004b, 2009, 2012, 2016), Eyerman (2002, 2013, 2015), and others 
(e.g., Erikson, 1976; Giesen, 2004; Smelser, 2004; Sztompka, 2000, 2004). This 
scholarship often tends to explicitly focus on trauma associated with a specific 
traumagenic event such as genocide, war and conflict, natural disasters, or acts of 
terrorism and social upheaval (see, e.g., Bartmanski and Eyerman, 2011; Eyerman, 
2015; Sztompka, 2000). Alexander writes: “cultural trauma occurs when members 
of a collectivity feel they have been subjected to a horrendous event that leaves in-
delible marks upon their group consciousness, marking their memories forever and 
changing their future identity in fundamental and irrevocable ways” (2012: 6). 
While recognized as a theoretically distinct concept, cultural trauma nonethe-
less builds upon and overlaps with a number of other concepts, notably psycho-
logical trauma (Lindemann, 1944; Zulueta, 2008). However, unlike psychological 
trauma, cultural trauma transcends the individual level, operating instead as a col-
lective/cultural-level phenomenon that nonetheless also has powerful individual 
impacts and consequences (Eyerman, 2013). At the same time, Alexander argues 
that “collective traumas are reflections of neither individual suffering nor actual 
events, but symbolic renderings that reconstruct and imagine them” (2012: 4). That 
is, they exist and are discursively mobilized in the realm of the collective imagina-
tion, evolving from social to cultural crisis in which the trauma becomes in some 
fundamental way “the core of the collectivity’s sense of its own identity” (ibid.: 
15). 
Most commentators frame cultural trauma as originating from radical devia-
tions from the social and cultural status quo, and in doing so examine the social pro-
cess through which cultural traumas become recognized and discursively framed. 
As Alexander argues (2012), the trauma process has several key elements. These 
include: the claim to an injury; “carrier groups” or agents who do the work of ar-
ticulating the meaning-making around the injury or event; the audience to which 
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discursive claims about cultural trauma are articulated; and the consolidation of a 
new master narrative that clarifies the nature of: (1) the pain; (2) the victim; (3) the 
relation of the trauma victim to the audience; and (4) the assigning of responsibi-
lity. It is this process that constructs and makes coherent the new master narrative 
of collective trauma which is inherently cultural in nature in the form of memory-
building and routinization. Whether or not this “trauma work” is fully completed is 
a key determinant in the degree to which cultural traumas gain recognition (Alexan-
der, 2004b, 2016). However, two important points emerge from the cultural trauma 
scholarship. First, not every trauma qualifies as cultural trauma, and, second, not 
all traumas affecting particular cultural groups “become” or are transformed into 
cultural traumas in the eyes of the larger society.
Trauma, the Romani Experience, and Political Agency
When considering cultural trauma as such, particular groups of people are typically 
identified as having experienced cultural-level traumagenic events. Ready exam-
ples include the Holocaust, especially with regard to the Jewish experience (Alex-
ander, 2004a, 2009; Alexander and Dromi, 2011), the African American experience 
with regard to slavery (Eyerman, 2002), and those who have lived through natural 
disasters (Erikson, 1976; Eyerman, 2015). In each case affected groups have expe-
rienced traumatic events that have largely shaped their identities with regard to their 
everyday lives, political, economic and social situation and status. 
But what about those for whom trauma is a fundamental and constitutive 
part of identity and everyday phenomenological experience, and yet which hasn’t 
achieved wider recognition as a “master narrative” of collective trauma? The Ro-
ma Holocaust, the exclusion of Roma, and the suffering, killing and humiliation of 
Roma are not experienced as the pain and trauma of the broader Hungarian soci-
ety. These problems are rather understood as the problem of Romani people them-
selves, a perspective that both further enables and is a consequence of the de facto 
second-class citizenship of Romani people. By “second-class citizenship” we refer 
to the condition of not being granted full and equal rights and protections under the 
law, tightly coupled with the broader social perception of being “other” and not eli-
gible for or deserving of those equal rights and protections. While citizenship, for-
mally understood, is a legal status, as Reiter argues, “it needs to be a practical and 
practiced reality for it to have any impact on peoples’ lives” (2012: 1070). That is, 
despite any existing and formally and legally delineated citizens’ rights, “if some 
citizens are not treated as citizens, citizenship remains an empty concept” (ibid.). In 
the Hungarian context it is the Roma who arguably pose the most direct challenge 
to popular conceptions of “Hungarianness” than any other minority group, even de-
spite Hungary’s long and continued legacies of antisemitism (Kyriazi, 2012; Tóth 
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and Grajczjár, 2015). Hence, Roma second-class citizenship can be understood as 
part of a broader set of social exclusions of Roma that are not only social and po-
litical, but cultural, economic, institutional and representational (McGarry, 2014; 
Szalai and Zentai, 2014).
As long as a group within Hungary is not as fully “Hungarian” as others, their 
problems and trauma are not perceived as a Hungarian trauma. As Alexander writes, 
“Roma (‘Gypsies’) are acknowledged by many contemporary Central Europeans 
as trauma victims, the bearers of a tragic history. Yet insofar as large numbers of 
Central Europeans represent Roma people as deviant and uncivilized, they have 
not made that tragic past their own” (2012: 19). When Roma were killed in a series 
of serial hate crimes in 2007-2008 in Hungary, the mainstream did not consider it 
a trauma of the entire Hungarian society, but rather a somewhat predictable reac-
tion to “Gypsy crime”, “Gypsy terror”, and an ethnic group discursively framed as 
criminals and parasites (Tóth and Grajczjár, 2015).
With regard to the “trauma process” then, the implication is that this process is 
incomplete because “only if the victims are represented in terms of valued qualities 
shared by the larger collective identity will the audience be able to symbolically par-
ticipate in the experience of the originating trauma” (Alexander, 2012: 19). How-
ever, in the case of the Roma of Hungary and indeed Central Europe more broadly, 
this lack of broader recognition of trauma is precisely a consequence and an indica-
tor of the traumagenic “event” itself: the historic patterns of systemic, and extreme 
social, political and economic exclusion of Romani people. That is, the failure of 
the very real “cultural” trauma experienced by Romani people3 to achieve full re-
cognition by a wider social audience is at the same time perhaps paradoxically a 
fundamental and constitutive part of that cultural trauma.
Within Hungary the case of Roma is pivotal given that they are the largest, the 
most disadvantaged, and the most politically, socially and economically excluded 
minority (McGarry, 2009; Parker, 2012; Rovid, 2012; Schafft and Brown, 2000; 
Varadi and Virag, 2014).4 The arrival of Romani people into what is present-day 
3 We refer to trauma which, to be clear, has repeatedly metastasized from social exclusion into 
outright violence and persecution.
4 In Hungary the estimated number of Roma varies. More conservative estimates place the Ro-
mani population at 400-600 thousand, or about 4-6% of the country’s total population (Balogh, 
2012; Kemény, 2005), although other estimates run as high as 800,000 (Wilkin, 2016). Across 
Europe the Romani population is estimated at around 12 million (Mitchell, 2005). There is sig-
nificant debate regarding how ethnic identity is determined and how identity should be counted. 
A more comprehensive discussion of how ethnic identity is determined and counted is beyond 
the scope of this paper, although nonetheless directly relevant to the question of minority rights 
and political representation. For a more complete treatment of these issues we refer the reader to 
Krizsán (2012), McGarry (2014), Pap (2015), and Tremlett (2014), among others.
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Hungary most likely occurred sometime around the 13th or 14th centuries (Crowe, 
1991; Kemény, 2005). The Romani people therefore have not only had a long, un-
broken history within the region but also a history marked by social stigma, exclu-
sion, economic marginalization, and persecution (Crowe, 1991).
In the 20th century Roma were targeted by Germany’s Third Reich, abetted by 
Hungary’s fascist Arrow Cross party, and an estimated 30,000 Hungarian Roma 
died in the Holocaust out of a total estimated population of 200,000 (Crowe, 1991; 
Kemény, 2005). The Roma Holocaust is one of the main cultural and historical trau-
mas experienced by Roma people in recent history (Stillmann and Johanson, 2007), 
and it continues to play a significant role in various aspects of group identity, col-
lective suffering and its consequences. 
In the early 1990s the social, political and economic transformations associ-
ated with the collapse of state socialism, including economic contraction and in 
some cases industrial collapse, left Hungarians in newly precarious circumstances 
(Brown and Schafft, 2002). The Roma especially, employed in state-supported in-
dustry and economic sectors, suffered from sudden job loss while the economic 
strains proved a fertile ground for the emergence of racism, hate crime, and nation-
alism, often directed against Roma. By 1993, while the national unemployment rate 
rose to about 14%, for Roma unemployment was 60-70%, rising to 75% by 1995, 
whereas the overall unemployment rate fell to about 11% (Havas et al., 1995). The 
further ethnicizing of poverty conditions has had the effect of strengthening racist 
beliefs within Hungarian society (Schwarcz, 2012). 
During the 1990s and 2000s, Hungary experienced a new rise in far-right po-
litics and nationalist movements. This included MIÉP5 in the 1990s, later super-
seded by Jobbik, which formed as a right-wing student political organization and 
formalized as a political party in 2003. While Jobbik’s initial influence was slight, 
this changed in the mid-2000s with political scandals in the left-wing government 
led by Ferenc Gyurcsány, and continued economic stagnation on the national le-
vel only worsened by the 2008 credit crises. Hungarian politics, as a consequence, 
took a sharp turn to the right as the Fidesz political party, under Viktor Orbán, as-
sumed leadership. But Jobbik too became a legitimate political player, running on 
a far-right populist and nationalist platform that was also explicitly antisemitic and 
anti-Gypsy, popularizing the term “Gypsy crime” within the mainstream political 
discourse, and referring to Roma as “parasites” (Human Rights First, 2014). This 
rhetoric, however, was by no means confined to Jobbik and its supporters. In 2013 
5 MIÉP, the Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja (Hungarian Justice and Life Party), was a nation-
alist political party formed in 1993 that briefly achieved parliamentary representation after the 
1998 election cycle.
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Zsolt Bayer, one of the co-founders of Fidesz, wrote in a column in the Magyar 
Hirlap6:
A significant part of the Roma are unfit for existence. They are not fit to live 
among people. These Roma are animals and they behave like animals. When they 
meet with resistance, they commit murder. ... These animals shouldn’t be allowed 
to exist. In no way. That needs to be solved – immediately and regardless of the 
method (Kóczé, 2015: 97). 
That this type of discourse could appear in a leading national newspaper is both 
astonishing and an indicator of the general public acceptance for what can only be 
described as hate speech with the imprimatur of a major media outlet. In the 2010 
parliamentary elections, Jobbik won 16.7% of the vote, and by the 2014 parliamen-
tary elections, Jobbik had won over 20% of the popular vote in the national elec-
tions (a tenfold increase in votes from 2006), pulling Fidesz even further to the right 
(Human Rights First, 2014; Tóth and Grajczjár, 2015).
Trauma and Roma Political Agency in Hungary
Despite the history of trauma for Hungarian Roma, Hungary is nonetheless distin-
guished by a set of minority statutes that are unique to the region and that have cre-
ated new, albeit deeply ambivalent, political and civic spaces for Romani commu-
nities. In 1993, after several years of negotiation the Hungarian Parliament enacted 
Act 77 on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities. The legislation was notable 
for several reasons. First, it marked a significant shift away from the assimilationist 
policies of the former communist regime (Vermeersch, 2007) and instead replaced 
those policies with legislation that was based around the concept of “cultural auto-
nomy” which was focused around the rights of minorities to use minority langua-
ges, exert agency over educational issues affecting minority groups, politically self-
organize, and collectively participate in civic life. 
Political self-organization was embodied in the legislation principally through 
the creation of a system of minority self-governance, unique within the region, for 
the 13 minority groups recognized by the Act.7 At the local level, minority self-
governments are formed at the municipality level and function primarily as a con-
sultative linkage between the municipal government and the represented minority, 
6 Magyar Hirlap is a leading Hungarian national newspaper known for its general support for 
more conservative viewpoints.
7 These groups included Roma, German, Croat, Slovak, Serb, Armenian, Romanian, Polish, Slo-
vene, Greek, Bulgarian, Ruthenian and Ukrainian minorities. Minority status recognized in the 
Act as having particular protection was based upon a minority group’s historical longevity within 
Hungary, as well as having distinct languages and cultural traditions.
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although self-governments are also charged with the authority to organize local 
educational institutions, run enterprises and establish foundations. In practice then, 
if not in name, self-governments are less representative governmental bodies than 
legislatively sanctioned organizations structured around particular cultural func-
tions, although they may take on various quasi-political roles as well.
In 1993 and 1994 the first elections for self-governments were held, at which 
time over 800 local minority self-governments were formed, over half of them Ro-
ma. The trend has been for an overall increase in minority self-governments, after 
2011 renamed nationality self-governments (Pap, 2015). During the 2014 elections 
nearly 1,200 Roma nationality self-governments were formed, meaning that almost 
40% of Hungarian municipalities contained a Roma nationality self-government. 
Since the enactment of the legislation, the total number of Roma nationality self-
governments has also consistently been greater than the number of all other na-
tionality self-governments of all the other minority groups combined (Schafft and 
Kulcsár, 2015).
The system, despite the prevalence of self-governments, has faced serious cri-
ticism since its beginning. First of all, the problems and challenges affecting Hun-
gary’s Roma are not so much “cultural”8 in the sense of the need to preserve tradi-
tions and heritage (although this is a need as well), but rather social and economic. 
While for many Roma communities preserving and enhancing cultural traditions is 
a priority, the most immediate problems facing most Roma are connected to pover-
ty, unemployment, education, housing, and discrimination. Neither the scope of the 
nationality self-government system nor the resources afforded to it are in any way 
sufficient to meaningfully address these problems (Human Rights Watch, 1996; 
Kóczé, 2015; Majtényi and Majtényi, 2016). Because of the minimal resources af-
forded to self-governments, coupled with the narrow scope of self-government as 
delineated by the Minorities Law, the very term “self-government” is fundamen-
tally misleading as it not only may raise unrealistic expectations on the part of the 
Roma minority, but also opens the possibility for municipal governments to pass 
responsibility for social welfare management onto the self-government, further eth-
nicizing the social problems of the Roma and reinforcing the perception that Ro-
ma impoverishment is a “natural” condition (Schafft and Kulcsár, 2015; Schwarcz, 
2012; see also van Baar, 2012).
8 That said, as we have argued in this paper, the problems of the Roma are distinctly “cultural” in 
the sense that they are related to a broader set of cultural norms within the Hungarian society that 
reproduce the social exclusion of Roma. However, this is a “cultural” problem of the Hungarian 
society in general, which especially in recent years has turned increasingly towards embracing 
xenophobic and intolerant beliefs and attitudes (Human Rights First, 2014; Kóczé, 2015; Majté-
nyi and Majtényi, 2016; Tóth and Grajczjár, 2015; Varadi and Virág, 2014).
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Other observers have pointed to the way in which the Minorities Law was ar-
guably motivated far less by the desire to significantly address minority rights with-
in Hungary (especially since, with the exception of the Roma, minority national 
and ethnic minority populations are both relatively small and well-assimilated into 
Hungarian society) than by the political economic interest in the large concentra-
tions of ethnic Hungarian minorities in surrounding neighboring countries, notably, 
Romania, Slovakia and Serbia (Human Rights Watch, 1996; Schafft and Kulcsár, 
2015; Vermeersch, 2007). Enclave communities of ethnic Hungarians in neighbor-
ing countries are primarily a consequence of the shrinking of Hungary’s borders in 
accordance with the Treaty of Trianon after the First World War. Many Hungarians 
consider this loss of territory itself as a “cultural trauma” (Kyriazi, 2016; Pytlas, 
2016). The Minorities Law then can, by extension, be cynically read as more a re-
action to the perceived trauma of the loss of “greater Hungary”, than as a legitimate 
effort to foster an open, multi-ethnic society by creating new opportunities for po-
litical participation for marginalized and under-represented groups (much less the 
Roma specifically).
Cohen argues that citizenship as a status is not binary – something one either 
possesses or does not – but rather “exists on a continuum” (2014: 1048; see also 
Sardelić, 2016). From this observation that citizenship may under a variety of cir-
cumstances be only partially realized, Cohen argues that semi-citizenship (2009, 
2014) reflects a partial granting of social, civil and political rights. Hungary’s na-
tionality self-government system represents an interesting case since, on its face, it 
appears to embody a positive move towards ensuring full rights and citizenship to 
marginalized groups. In the instance of the Roma, however, it paradoxically rein-
forces a de facto semi-citizenship by establishing a system that institutionalizes fur-
ther social and political distance between minority and majority.
Cultural Trauma and Political Participation: 
The Perspectives of Romani Self-Government Leaders
In the spring of 2015 we conducted interviews with 30 Roma nationality self-go-
vernment leaders from 19 municipalities across 12 counties, sites that included vil-
lages, medium-sized towns and larger urban centers. The interviews were conduct-
ed in order to better understand how local Romani leaders themselves understood 
the roles, possibilities and limitations of the nationality self-governance system, 
how they constructed their own sense of agency, and the impact of far-right politi-
cal movements on their activities and sense of efficacy. 
To sample sites, we consulted media sources, Roma rights nongovernmental 
organizations, and from other researchers in the field in order to identify, first, pla-
ces with Roma nationality self-governments where there had been a history of eth-
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nic conflict or tension, including places containing Jobbik-affiliated or supported 
leaders in the municipal government, and second, places with Roma nationality 
self-governments that had a strong history of political activities and social organ-
izing within the municipality, often including cooperative and collaborative rela-
tionships with the local municipal government and/or other key community insti-
tutions. Ten sites we characterized as having histories of conflict, while nine sites 
were characterized rather by collaborative activity and political participation. Each 
interview was conducted in person, with interviews typically lasting between one 
and two hours. The interviews were then transcribed, and then coded and analyzed 
using NVivo qualitative data analysis software. Despite our purposeful sampling, 
various elements of trauma and exclusion appeared in every interview. While inter-
viewees from places marked by conflict spoke directly to that conflict, trauma was 
an underlying theme across all the interviews. This took several forms, including 
references to perceptions of second-class citizenship, being “othered” as Roma, as 
well as references to specific traumatic events, including the Roma Holocaust and 
the more recent serial murders of Roma.
Our sample only includes Roma nationality self-government leaders and so 
it is by no means a representative sample of Romani people in Hungary, or even 
within the villages, towns and cities represented by these leaders. Nonetheless, be-
cause of the status of these interviewees as public representatives of Roma nation-
ality self-governments, they have a unique perspective on the dynamics of social 
and political exclusions for Romani people, and the particular challenges facing 
their communities. It is the particularity of this perspective that we are interested in 
within this article.
Second-Class Citizenship
The Romani leaders we spoke with described second-class citizenship ontologically 
in terms of secondary status being a constitutive part of the lived experience of the 
Roma, but also the practical consequences of this with regard to legal protections, 
political representation and access to basic services and institutions such as health 
care and education. We frequently heard assessments of the social conditions of the 
Roma like the following:
The Roma are oppressed. They are oppressed... I think that the situation in Hun-
gary actually works to push them down even more... you cannot go past this, you 
cannot say this is not true... The Roma have always been persecuted. They do not 
know us, do not know who we are. And they do not want to get close to us and to 
cooperate with us. (Central Hungary, town)
There are problems with discrimination because you can go anywhere in institu-
tions and places and it’s mostly Hungarian. Whenever they can they employ Hun-
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garian people. They will say this is because the Roma do not have the educational 
attainment... but I think there is an element of being a Roma. (Southern Hungary, 
village)
The majority looks down on us. We are not given equal chances, equal opportu-
nities. That’s what we ask for – only equal opportunity, equal treatment; both in 
education and in work. (Northeastern Hungary, village)
All of these quotes speak to the experience of discrimination, especially with 
respect to education and employment. However, they also reveal a more fundamen-
tal experience of marginalization and social exclusion as a part of the very iden-
tity of being Roma. A Romani leader in central Hungary stated simply: “It’s much 
harder for us to receive something that would be our due because of our citizenship 
as Hungarians”. As Perišić and Vidojević argue, “the complexity of public opinion 
about the poor and the socially excluded is reflected through public attitudes that 
are a mixture of compassion and antagonism, frequently followed by rigid and am-
bivalent assumptions and stereotypes” (2015: 144). The dynamics of social exclu-
sion frame the excluded as unworthy and in large part as the ones to blame for their 
circumstances. This exclusion and stigmatization itself is part of the phenomeno-
logical experience of Roma-identity-associated cultural trauma. 
While the experience is phenomenological, it also has clear consequences with 
regard to basic life chances and social mobility. A persistent issue, especially in the 
last two decades, has been equal access to educational opportunities, and especially 
at the local level given the segregation of Romani students from ethnic Hungarian 
students through the establishment of privately run religious schools that are able to 
selectively admit students, in the process excluding Romani youth. A local Romani 
leader explained:
The school is a hundred percent Roma. It is more a problem that the level of edu-
cation is not high enough. So even if they have marks of four and five (A or Bs) 
when they get out they don’t perform well enough. They cannot go on to high-
er education. Because here at the schools they do not demand the same, or are 
not able to provide the same level of education as... as in other schools... private 
schools or not all-Roma schools in Hungary. It’s... it’s as if they were doing it 
deliberately, creating the appearance that we are really undereducated, illiterate 
and... and displaying improper behavior, and thereby contributing to the problem 
of the country even though we’ve been living here for hundreds if not thousands 
of years. Our roots are here. We are rooted here. So it is not like we are recent im-
migrants. That is not the case. Our roots go back several hundred years and those 
people who are Hungarian now... Roma have been here longer... longer than some 
of them, such as Viktor Orbán, yet he is considered Hungarian and we are not. 
We are not asking for too much – only equality. We are not asking to be helped by 
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extra help from the big budget to throw money at us. All we want is to be equal. 
Equal chances, equal opportunities for our kids to receive the same education. 
(italics ours) (Northeastern Hungary, village)
As the above interviewee suggests, education as a right is significantly violat-
ed in Hungary when it comes to Romani students, a social issue that has been well 
documented (Majtényi and Majtényi, 2015; Rostas, 2012; Zolnay, 2012). The prob-
lem of education of Roma is multilateral. On the one hand, there are several schools 
where Roma students are taught in a segregated manner. These schools can be either 
segregated buildings or classrooms, where only Romani students study. However, 
the issue of segregation does not stop at this point. As the interviewee also pointed 
out, the education of Romani children is not as rigorous or as high-quality as that 
received by their non-Romani peers due to the fact that Romani children in these 
schools receive substandard care, less qualified teachers are employed, and the edu-
cational methods are generally inferior to those in mainstream schools (Rostas, 
2012; Zolnay, 2012). 
Despite consistent patterns of exclusion, as the interviewee confirmed, self-
awareness as such persists especially in terms of citizenship and affiliation. This 
Romani leader stated: “Our roots are here. We are rooted here.” All these claims 
clearly imply the issue of belonging as well as the identity of being a citizen of a 
given country. Despite evidence to the contrary, in contemporary Hungary, Romani 
people are considered to represent a part of the society that doesn’t want to belong 
to the greater country, that doesn’t want to claim Hungarian citizenship. However, 
as the Romani leader quoted above notes, the desire of Roma to be equal citizens9 
is in fact strong. Rather, it is the openness of the majority that is largely ambivalent 
or missing. 
The Present Seen through the Trauma of the Past
We have argued here that the trauma experienced by contemporary Roma in Hun-
gary and elsewhere cannot be tightly connected to specific historical traumatic in-
stances of events, but rather is a trauma that is reproduced on a daily basis through 
the social exclusion embodied by second-class citizenship. At the same time, there 
is no question that there are particular historical events that also fundamentally 
shape the experience of Romani trauma. Perhaps most prominent is the Roma Holo-
caust which came up repeatedly in our interviews, particularly as a reference point 
9 To become an equal citizen does not imply losing the Romani identity. Nor does it imply as-
similation and loss of ethnic identity. In an open society social markers such as skin color, eth-
nicity, religion, and gender should not pose a barrier to the full realisation of citizenship rights 
and recognition.
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for understanding and interpreting current political realities. One interviewee spoke 
to us about the difficulties and challenges of being a local leader in the twin context 
of economic problems and rising racism and ethnic tensions. He explained:
What percentage (of the population that) is prejudiced... the rate is shocking. 
Shocking. So here we are living in a period just now which displaced the same 
tensions and problems such as unemployment in pre-war Germany. The economic 
crisis... we can see the same trends. Let’s take a glance back. How could Hitler af-
fect people from exactly the same factors... economic crisis? Germany could not 
solve the problem. They had to find a scapegoat. It was always the given minority 
who they put it on, the Jews or the Gypsies... they are responsible. Even though we 
know it was a global problem, but they had to find a scapegoat and such a scape-
goat is always the Gypsies.10 
Here the interviewee clearly links the current economic and social circum-
stances at play at both the local and national levels with the historical referent of the 
Holocaust and specifically the risk of scapegoating, itself an expression of second-
class citizenship. In another town we were similarly told by another Romani leader 
from Northern Hungary:
I cannot tell you that, but I... I assume it must generate tensions. Certainly, I also 
suppose that they intimidate people to such an extent. You know they come to 
me... in Nazi times... what they used to do when they tell their monologues, and 
they are doing the same thing in Hungary now on a smaller scale. But I am telling 
you... maybe at the next elections. It’s not certain that Jobbik will not win. That 
we will not have to pack up and leave. Otherwise we will end up like the Jews. We 
will be collected in the trains. 
These quotes are important because they not only speak to the Romani iden-
tity as permanently and profoundly shaped by the trauma of the Holocaust, but the 
ways in which those horrors are reference points for contemporary experiences with 
racism and exclusion. In referring to themselves as the ultimate scapegoats of so-
cial and economic crisis, the evidence is strongly suggestive of the ways in which 
the Holocaust, accompanied by a long history of social exclusion, has left indelible 
marks upon the consciousness of Romani people.
Another leader we spoke to described a series of events in his town which pre-
cipitated into a series of tense confrontations between local Romani residents and 
members of the Hungarian Guard. At one point during the conflict members of a 
non-governmental organization came to the town to meet with the Romani leaders 
10 The quotes here reflect the speaker’s terminology. Some speakers used the term “Roma” ex-
clusively, while some used “Gypsy” (in Hungarian, cigány), while others used both terms inter-
changeably. Our translations reflect the usage in the original Hungarian. 
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and witness the conflict situation firsthand. This Romani leader describes the recep-
tion and response by the Hungarian Guard even in the presence of local police who 
had been deployed ostensibly to prevent violence.
They came here and they said to János to take them around in the Roma inhabited 
sections. They want to see with their own eyes what’s going on. So he took them 
around, guided them and when they get to the corner of Bajczi Street here, ima-
gine: “Goddamn Jews, goddamn Gypsies, soap should be made of you in Auschwitz. 
Why didn’t you just die?” Things like this were said in front of the policeman, be-
cause these policemen were sympathizing with these goddamn fucking Nazis.
The Holocaust is a reference point of historical trauma. But as historical trauma 
it is at once also immediately tangible in the form not simply of history “repeating 
itself”, but in the form of latent racism and exclusion surfacing as actual organized 
racial violence and threat.
A second, and not unconnected, reference point that many leaders spoke of was 
the series of Roma murders and other acts of violence in the latter half of the 2000s. 
In 2006 in the village of Olaszliszka in Northeastern Hungary a non-Roma man was 
killed by local Roma after he had hit (though not seriously injured) a local girl with 
his car. Many in Hungary interpreted that event as a catalyst for not only inflaming 
anti-Gypsy rhetoric, but also for a number of ethnic conflicts and acts of violence 
against Roma. In 2008 and 2009 a series of attacks on Roma by a small group of 
militant skinheads took place over nine different municipalities involving drive-by 
shootings and Molotov cocktails that in total left six dead (including a five-year-old 
boy), and at least five people injured (Balogh, 2012; Human Rights First, 2014). 
Later, in 2011, 277 Roma had to be evacuated from the town of Gyöngyöspata by 
the Red Cross because of continued harassment by the Hungarian Guard (Human 
Rights First, 2014).
“I trace this back to the lynching in Olaszliszka. That’s my feeling”, said a 
prominent Romani leader in an urban area in Southern Hungary.
I have never seen this in print but we Gypsies sometimes talk about this amongst 
ourselves. And this has reinforced my opinion that this was the first step from 
which you can clearly see that prejudice against Gypsies has become more domi-
nant. And then you have Jobbik which in order to get into power uses the negative 
feelings and prejudice against Gypsies and Jews.
Regardless of how and whether cultural trauma is more broadly recognized 
outside of the Romani experience, Romani people not only share the traumatic ex-
periences that unify their experiences and identity, but they further reconstruct it. 
The remark that “we Gypsies sometimes talk about this amongst ourselves” points 
towards this and demonstrates that Romani individuals attempt to carry out their 
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own trauma process by reconstructing and giving meaning to these traumatizing 
events. Another Romani leader from a village in Northern Hungary not far from 
Olaszliszka told us:
Nobody could protect the Roma (during the peak of anti-Roma violence). Neither 
the Hungarian government nor the national Roma self-government could demon-
strate that they are able to protect the Roma. Yes they are in small settlements... 
do you know what they were doing? They created guards where we had to protect 
the population. We went and we did not sleep for whole nights guarding the Roma 
quarters. Not the police, but us! And I can say this about every settlement. Why? 
Because we were afraid for our relatives. Nobody stood by us. Neither the national 
self-government, nor the county level self-government, and nor did the govern-
ment, the actual Hungarian government, the state stood by the Roma at that time. 
What should they have done? After the first Roma murder to really stand up in the 
parliament and tell them to do something instead of hiding their head in the sand. 
Which is what they did. Which is terrible.
Conclusions
A comprehensive list of anti-Roma incidents on the part of paramilitary hate groups, 
political parties and in everyday life in Hungary since the early 1990s would be 
long indeed. But the cultural trauma of Romani people cannot be identified or de-
termined by a specific or discrete set of historical incidents and events. It is based 
instead on a much longer history of systematic exclusion, discrimination, and hu-
miliation. Because of this, we argue that a fundamental aspect of Romani cultural 
trauma is the lived experience of second-class citizenship, punctuated by events 
of extreme exclusion and violence such as the Roma Holocaust and the more re-
cent killings of Roma. Second-class citizenship for Romani people thus occupies a 
critical role in the dynamics of exclusion, constituting a primary mechanism for the 
“ethnicization” of Roma-related traumas by non-Roma (Schwarcz, 2012) – a fram-
ing of Roma trauma as “other” just as the Roma themselves have been framed as 
“other” (Perišić and Vidojević, 2015). 
As long as the citizenship of Roma is considered to be less legitimate than non-
Roma, the recognition of trauma will be negligible. The perception of second-class 
citizenship fundamentally impedes a common understanding of suffering during the 
Roma Holocaust or the recent killings of Roma, antigypsyism, systematic segrega-
tion and discrimination as social facts with moral and ethical implications for the 
entire nation.11 Given this condition wherein Roma are largely left alone with their 
11 The same can largely be said for contemporary Hungarian attitudes towards the Jewish Ho-
locaust given the antisemitism often expressed in Hungarian popular discourse (Human Rights 
First, 2014; Tóth and Grajczjár, 2015).
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“own” traumas, the Romani people have had no real “audience” that can recognize, 
legitimate and help reconcile the traumatic pain and tragedy.12 “Loneliness” in this 
sense functions as a further barrier that has placed Romani people at an even greater 
distance from non-Roma, since these traumatic problems have been ethnicized by 
non-Roma. 
Non-Romani citizens have never widely recognized Romani trauma as a com-
mon problem requiring solutions through collective societal efforts. This stance of 
the mainstream has further deepened the traumatic circumstances of Roma, lead-
ing, as part of a vicious cycle, to ever deeper social exclusion. Despite the fact that 
cultural trauma as a theoretical concept does not fully accommodate the experience 
of Roma, at least according to some observers (Alexander, 2012), it is undeniable 
that Roma have endured acute discomfort, second-class citizenship and many tragic 
events. These experiences are not only an historical fact, but are readily apparent 
from the personal life experiences of Romani individuals across Hungary. 
Cultural trauma does not only appear in philosophical and psychological terms, 
but also in the practice of politics and political mobilization. Given the second-class 
citizen status of Roma, their full political representation has yet to be realized. In-
stead they continue to contend with hatred and antigypsyism perpetrated by radical 
right-wing parties, as well as by increasing nationalism and populism. Despite of all 
these factors, Roma are well aware of their historical role in the Hungarian society, 
and continue to express their right of belonging to Hungary as full citizens. The al-
tering of the political narrative and the transformation in public attitudes regarding 
the Roma and the secondary citizenship will be the nexus of the change.13 The cur-
rent political and social climate, however, provides ample evidence of the serious 
challenges that lie ahead.
12 We refer to various nations where significant number of Romani people reside. 
13 Among the many measures that could be taken to address Romani exclusion and disadvan-
tage, we argue that one of the first steps is the unconditional recognition of Romani people as 
full citizens.
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